

ECPR General Conference, Pisa, 6-8 September 2007

Section: The political participation of immigrants in European cities

Panel 1: Political opportunities for immigrants' political participation (I)

Religious cleavages, organizations and the political participation of immigrants in Milan and Zurich

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Abstract

Although both the political opportunity structure and the organizational approaches highlight structures of opportunities and constraints for the mobilization of actors they have mostly developed and kept separate. The aim of this paper is to try to consider both perspectives in the explanation of collective action. By using data on migrants' political participation in Milan and Zurich we look at how the institutional and organizational structures overlap or differ in defining opportunities and constraints for migrants' mobilization in the two cities. In particular, we look at the religious structures by considering, on one hand, how institutions deal with religious rights and, on the other hand, how the religion shapes organizational memberships. Our findings show that when the religious cleavage is recognized at the institutional level, it seems to favor the polarization of the organizational structure around religion, like in Milan. In this case, both the institutional and organizational structures define opportunities and constraints along religion which thus becomes a salient issue for political participation and migrants' mobilization. Differently, in cases in which the religious cleavage is not recognized at the institutional level, such as in Zurich, the organizational context is more heterogeneous and less polarized around religion which thus does not become a salient issue for political participation and migrants' mobilization.

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Results presented in this paper have been obtained within the project "Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants' Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at the Local Level (LOCALMULTIDEM)". This project is funded by the European Commission under the 6th Framework Programme's Priority 7 "Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-Based Society" as a STREP instrument (contract no. CIT5-CT-2005-028802). The LOCALMULTIDEM consortium is coordinated by the University of Murcia (Dr. Laura Morales), and is formed, additionally, by the University of Geneva (Dr. Marco Giugni), the University of Trento (Dr. Mario Diani), the University of Bristol (Dr. Paul Statham), the CEVIPOF-Sciences Po Paris (Dr. Manlio Cinalli), and the MTAKI (Dr. Endre Sik).

Introduction

Although Switzerland and Italy are both countries in which the acquisition of citizenship follows the principle of *ius sanguinis*, similarities in the conditions applied for the acquisition of citizenship rights at the individual level are contrasted by stronger differences in the cultural context of the two countries. This is particularly relevant with respect to the religious dimension and the different ways in which the 2 countries deal with the State-Church cleavage (Rokkan 1970). According to the political opportunity structure approach, the POS, different cultural contexts shape different opportunities for the mobilization of actors and of migrants in particular (Koopmans e Statham 2000, Koopmans et al 2005). Migrants with values and norms matching those spread in the cultural environment of the host countries would be in a better position for mobilizing given the more open opportunities with respect to migrants whose cultural orientations are different. However, stressing the importance of institutional cleavages does not give the necessary attention to the role that other social actors may play in redefining opportunities and constraints of potential mobilizing actors. Some authors have emphasised that intermediate social structures in which actors are embedded, namely organizations of which they are members of, can also provide the necessary resources for the mobilization of actors (McCarthy, Zald 1977, Diani and McAdam 2003). However, whereas the POS literatures has neglected the intermediate structural basis for the mobilization, the resource mobilization theories have rather ignored the broader political and cultural environment (Rucht 1996).

We draw on Simmel and Rokkan's works to consider both the institutional context and the intermediate organizational structures in the definition of constraints and opportunities for mobilizing actors. Rokkan's work provides useful hints to connect the 2 structural levels given that he highlights that in a highly institutionalized segmented system where cleavages are sharp, memberships in parties tend to form concentric circles and political subcultures (Rokkan 1970, Diani 2000). If this is true for the polarization of the electoral system, this may also hold true for the organizational structure and its stronger polarization on cleavages defined along traits recognized and defined by the institutions. On its side, also Simmel's work on intersecting and concentric webs seems helpful: when structures overlap and form concentric webs as in a highly segmented system, actors' attributes and actions are defined by opportunities and constraints shaped by the specific recognized attributes. Differently, when structures intersect, actors' attributes and actions are defined by opportunities and constraints which are shaped along different attributes (Simmel [1890] 1998, Diani 2000).

The aim of the paper is to understand migrants' political participation in Milan and Zurich considering the opportunities and constraints shaped by the institutional and organizational structures in the 2 cities.

Given the different ways in which the 2 cities deal with the State-Church cleavage, we particularly focus on the role of religion within the institutions and in the organizational context. We ask the following specific questions:

1. How do institutions and organizational contexts in Milan and Zurich shape opportunities and constraints at the religious level?
2. How is political participation affected by religion in the 2 cities ? In particular, what is the role of religious organizational memberships for political participation in contexts where religious organizational membership overlaps with the institutional recognition of religion and in context where it does not ?

In order to analyse these questions we use data collected in 2007 on Milan and Zurich on the political opportunity structures and data collected through an individual survey on the participation of migrants in the social and political life in the 2 cities. We consider 3 different ethnic groups in

each cities (Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians in Milan and Italians, Turks and Kosovars in Zurich).

The paper is organized as follows: we discuss the theoretical implications of considering structures of opportunities and constraints both at the institutional and organizational level. Secondly we describe the data and methods used in the analyses and third we present our study on Milan and Zurich.

The institutional and organizational structures

Institutional and organizational structures define 2 levels of opportunities and constraints shaping the political mobilization of actors. According to the emphasis placed on one or the other, two different perspectives have developed: one explanation stems directly from recent work on social movements that stressed the impact of political opportunity structures on the level of mobilization, the action repertoire and the policy effects of movements (e.g. Giugni 2004; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1989); the second approach, resource mobilization theories (McCarthy and Zald 1977), have particularly stressed the role of social movement industries, movement organizations and entrepreneurs in the process for mobilization. Within this perspective, several authors have underlined the opportunities and constraints shaped by networks of activists and organizations (Diani and McAdam 2003). The two approaches kept separated also with regard to studies of migrant political participation.

Along the institutional perspective scholars looking at collective claim makings of immigrants showed that the level as well as issues and scope of immigrants' claims depends upon the political opportunity structure or other institutional settings. Migrant mobilizations are specifically shaped by the conceptions of citizenship, that is, the specific opportunity structure to that field (Ireland 1994; Koopmans and Statham 2000, Koopmans et al. 2005). More specifically, what these scholars call conceptions of citizenship are the modes of incorporating migrants in the host society. Two dimensions constitute these modes. First, a cultural dimension which distinguishes between multiculturalism or cultural pluralism (countries such as Britain and the Netherlands) and assimilationism or cultural monism (such as France and Switzerland) and which defines the cultural requirements for the acquisition of citizenship. Multiculturalist countries recognize cultural differences and sometimes even promote it. On the contrary, assimilationist countries ask immigrants to assimilate to the majority culture. The second dimensions concerns the formal requirements for acquisition of citizenships and distinguishes between *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*, in other words between an ethnic conception of citizenship opposed to a civic-territorial one. These modes of incorporating migrants in the host society shape the political mobilizations of immigrants. In countries characterized by conceptions of citizenship combining multiculturalism with *jus soli* such as Britain and the Netherlands, collective claim makings by immigrants tend to be more focused on integration in the host country and on the extension of their collective rights. Whereas in countries such as Switzerland that combines a cultural monism with a *jus sanguinis*, collective claim makings by migrants tend to focus on conditions of entry and stay and to be oriented toward their homeland. These differences are explained by the different legitimacy theses opportunity structures give immigrants to intervene in the public sphere of the receiving country. A country with a more exclusive way of conceiving citizenship may exclude migrants from the majority political community and migrants would feel less legitimized to intervene on political issues in the host country and would develop less trust in the host country's society and institutions. By focusing mainly on collective claim-makings of immigrants and on how the institutional context shape it these works neglected the impact of the institutional context on intermediary social structures such as organizations.

On the other hand, other approaches have emphasized the role of organizations and the intermediary social structures. Scholars studying the opportunities and constraints set by the organizational structure within the migration field, have underlined the importance of organizational networks also for immigrants' political participation stressing that civic immigrant communities do indeed

positively affect the participation of these communities in the political sphere (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2001, Jacobs and Tillie 2004, Togeby 1999, van Heelsum 2005, Vermeulen 2006, Bloemraad 2006). However, not much work in this research tradition analyses the societal context that may influence social movement organizations and the external structuration of social movements (Kriesi 1996)².

To our knowledge, no much work has been done on the impact of the institutional structure on the structuration of intermediary social organizations in terms of issues and purpose. Kriesi and Baglioni (2003) analyze the impact of POS on civic organizational structures at the local level. Within the migration field, Vermeulen (2006) shows how immigrant organizational patterns (the creation and development of immigrants organizations) are partly shaped by POS (see also Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001, Bloemraad 2005). Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001) have for example considered the relevance of ethnic organizations. However, focusing on ethnic organizations seems to make sense in a context such as the Dutch one where due to specific POS immigrants are encouraged to organize on an ethnic basis. For Zurich and Milan following a more ethnic and assimilationist model in terms of individual and collective rights, the question remains of to what type of organizations do immigrants participate in.

As Rokkan's work has highlighted, social alignments in the intermediate social structure of parties emerge from historical developments and the political salience of the various cleavages and patterns of party coalitions fluctuate in reaction to contemporary events (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Party systems and political controversies are seen as the outgrowth of revolutions and their transformations³. In particular, in a highly institutionalized segmented system where cleavages are sharp, memberships in parties would tend to form political subcultures and concentric circles (Rokkan 1970, Diani 2000). If this is true for the polarization of the electoral system, this may also hold true for the organizational involvement for which its polarization would depend on the strength of cleavages emerging at the institutional level.

Following this, for the first question asking whether the institutional structure overlaps or differs with the organizational context with respect to how religion is dealt with in the 2 cities, we can put forward our first hypothesis: we expect that social and political recognition of the Catholic Church in Milan leads to a highly segmented system and to the emergence of an organizational context more strongly based on religious affiliations. The legitimacy that the Catholic religion has in Italy in intervening in the public sphere would more strongly emphasize the recognition and importance of definitions of reality based on cultural and specifically religious traits thus shaping practices and social interactions of actors, among which associational memberships, on a religious basis. Italian institutions showing higher levels of cultural polarization with respect to religion would provide a favourable context for the diffusion of memberships based on religion which would overlap with the institutional religious recognition⁴. Differently, the religious differentiation and heterogeneity in Zurich where both the Protestant and the Catholic Churches are officially recognized would lead to a more heterogeneous organizational context, to the emergence of more differentiated organizational membership certainly less polarized around religion.

² Rucht (1996) analyses the impact of external opportunities on movement structure and identifies different type of movement structures (party oriented model, grassroots model, interest group model).

³ The National Revolution and the Industrial Revolution led to four sources of cleavage: the center-periphery (conflict between the national culture and assorted subordinate ones, for example, ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups often located in the peripheries), the church-state tension (between the state, which sought to dominate, and the church, which tried to maintain its historic corporate rights) the land-industry cleavage (between the landed elite and the growing bourgeois class), the capitalist and workers (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

⁴ The religious affiliation is one among a few political subculture emerged in the Italian context in the postwar democracy. Other affiliations were provided by the Communist and Socialist parties (Poggi, 1968) proving the pivotal role of partisan memberships in shaping most associational affiliations (Diani online paper).

This has noteworthy consequences on the political participation of actors. As Diani emphasizes by citing Rokkan (Diani online paper): *‘The lower or higher level of system segmentation affects the characteristics of the political process as a whole: “In a highly ontzuild system [i.e., in a system with low segmentation and high criss-crossing of multiple memberships] there is low membership crystallization; most of the participants tend to be tied to organizations and environments exposing them to divergent political pressures. By contrast in a highly verzuild [i.e., segmented] system there is high membership crystallization; most of the participants tend to be exposed to messages and persuasive efforts in the same direction in all their 24-hour, 7-day environments (Rokkan, 1970: 105).”’*

If religious recognition at the institutional level matches with an organizational context polarized around religion, like in Milan, the institutional and organizational structures tend to form overlapping structures of opportunities and constraints. The religious cleavage would become a salient issue in shaping opportunities and constraints for political participation. On the contrary, institutions which do not recognize or produce a religious cleavage, like in Zurich, would define intersecting structures of opportunities with organizational structures and opportunities and constraints for mobilization would be defined along different attributes.

Overlapping and intersecting structures thus lead to different of opportunities and constraints for the mobilization of actors (Simmel [1890] 1998, Diani 2000). When structures defined on religion overlap, actors’ mobilization is strongly affected by religion because of its social recognition both at the macro institutional level and its reproduction at the meso level. Contrarily, in intersecting structures, the religious cleavage would not be as salient and opportunities for mobilization would be more varied and crosscutting.

Following this, we can formulate the second hypothesis: given the stronger salience of the religious cleavages in Milan, we expect the political participation of migrants in Milan be more strongly affected by the religious organizational membership. On the contrary, in Zurich where religious membership at the organizational level does not overlap with its institutional recognition and religion is not a salient issue it would not be so relevant in shaping the mobilization of actors. This means that, controlling for socio-demographic and socioeconomic variables, the probability of participating in a political activity would be more easily defined by religious membership in Milan than in Zurich.

Data and methods

Data derive from 2 datasets retrieved as part of an ongoing EU-funded research project (LOCALMULTIDEM – Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at the Local Level).

One concerns a group of indicators measured on a scale -1 to +1 to assess the specific political opportunity structure available to migrants with respect to the individual and cultural citizenship rights. We consider two groups of indicators operationalizing the two dimensions of the citizenship regime (Koopmans and Statham 2000). By considering individual and cultural rights as being on a -1 to +1 continuum, on the cultural rights dimension a score of 1 was assigned when the indicator was close to the cultural pluralism pole whereas a score of -1 was assigned when the indicator approached the cultural monism. Similarly, a score of one was assigned when the situation approached the civic conception of citizenship and a score of -1 when the indicators was close to an ethnic conception of citizenship on the individual right dimension (Koopmans et al 2005).

The second set of data we present are part of the results of a population survey carried in the cities of Milan and Zurich between November 2006 and April 2007⁵. The data consist of a random sample of six migrant groups: Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians in Milan and Italians,

⁵ The survey has been carried by the polling institute *érasme* in Geneva and by an institute on migration studies, ISMU, in Milan on the basis of a questionnaire elaborated within the LOCALMULTIDEM project..

Kosovars, and Turks in Zurich. A control group of Italian and Swiss citizens allows us to compare the organizational membership and political participation of migrants with that of nationals.

The Milan migrant sample is a random sample composed of 900 individuals stratified by the ethnic origin of members. It includes all migrants of Filipino, Egyptian and Ecuadorian origin independently of their country of birth. As table 1 shows, the Filipinos, the Egyptians and the Ecuadorians in Milan represent more than 35% of all foreigners residing in the city⁶.

The sample was selected through a method by centres of aggregation (Blangiardo 1999). Interviewed migrants were submitted a 30-35 minutes face-to-face structured questionnaire in Italian or in the language of origin of the interviewees. The Italian control group was made up of 300 individuals of Italian origin born in Italy who were submitted the same questionnaire by CATI⁷.

Table 1 Five first foreign countries' population (except EEA countries) over the total foreign resident population and over the total resident population (absolute numbers and percentage – 31 Dec. 2005), Municipality of Milan

	a.v.	% over total resident foreign population	% over total resident population
Philippines	26,633	16.36	2.05
Egypt	20,979	12.89	1.62
Peru	13,775	8.46	1.06
China	13,095	8.05	1.01
Ecuador	12,339	7.58	0.95
Total foreigners	162,782	100	12.55
Total residents	1,297,431	-	100

Source: statistical division – Municipality of Milan, Population Register

The Zurich sample was generated from the list of addresses provided by the Cantonal Office of Population. Given that this list provides no information about ethnic origin or identification, formal nationalities had to be used as a sampling frame. It is therefore not possible from this list to retrieve immigrants that have been naturalized and hence have Swiss citizenship. We thus define as migrants any person who does not have Swiss citizenship (i.e. foreigners). This is, by the way, the official definition adopted in the Swiss context. However, given the fact that access to citizenship is very limited in Switzerland and therefore most immigrants are foreigners, our approach allows us to grasp the bulk of migrants living in Zurich. The interviews in Zurich were conducted by telephone (CATI system) using a standardized, bilingual questionnaire for each migrant group. This was done to minimize potential biases due to different linguistic skills of respondents. Phone numbers were retrieved on the phone book starting from the name and address of the people in the sample. The average duration of each interview was 35 minutes. In this way, 300 Italians, 300 Turks, 302 Kosovars, and 301 Swiss were interviewed. The three groups of migrants were selected according to their numeric importance in the local context, but also so as to have variation in terms of ethnic and religious background. In 2005, these three groups represented respectively, 12.8%, 11.9% and 4.6% of the foreign population in the city of Zurich.⁸

Table 2: Six first foreign countries' population Zurich 2005

	a.v.	% over total resident foreign population	% over total resident population
Germany	19,309	17.4	5.2
Italy	14,241	12.8	3.9

⁶ In Italy the immigrant population still largely overlaps with the foreign population.

⁷ Data have been weighted before the analyses (by the center of aggregation, by gender and age).

⁸ The figure for Kosovars refers in fact to former Yugoslavians, as we have no valid estimation about the size and composition of the Kosovar population and the city of Zurich still registers Kosovars as former Yugoslavians.

Serbia-Montenegro	13,169	11.9	3.6
Portugal	7,553	6.8	2.1
Spain	5,360	4.8	1.5
Turkey	5,047	4.6	1.4
Total foreigners	110'892	100	30.2
Total residents	366'809	-	100

Source: Statistik Stadt Zürich, Bevölkerungsstatistik (BVS)

The questionnaire is the outcome of a collective effort by members of the LOCALMULTIDEM project and is in turn inspired by a questionnaire previously used in research carried by members of the “Multicultural Democracy in European Cities” network (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2001). It therefore allows cross-national and cross-city comparisons. It includes among other things a number of items concerning political integration (including political interest and participation), organizational membership, as well as various sociodemographic characteristics such as age, gender, education, socioeconomic status, and language proficiency.

To test our hypotheses we considered variables at three levels:

- national context
- organizational context (religious organizational membership).
- individual level: socio-demographic and socioeconomic variables

Analyses regarding the first question, the link between the institutional and organizational structures, are at a descriptive level and analyse how opportunities and constraints of the institutional and organizational contexts in Milan and Zurich are shaped by religion. We describe the institutional contexts of Milan and Zurich along the individual and differential group rights dimension of the citizenship regimes comparing the scores for each city. We then analyze the organizational memberships of migrants in the 2 cities using data collected through the population survey.

For the second question, we analyze how the religious memberships in organizations differently shape migrants’ political activities in the 2 cities. We perform binary logistic regressions separately for the Italian and the Swiss case studies to estimate the probability of performing at least one political activity by migrants in the 2 cities. The dependent and independent variables in the logistic regression are the followings:

Dependent variables:

Our dependent variable consists of a dichotomized variable in which a value of 1 is assigned whether an individual has performed at least one of 13 different kinds of political activities, specifically one of the following items:

- Contacted a politician
- Contacted a government or local government official
- Worked in a political party
- Worked in a political action group (NOTE: provide country-specific examples for correct translation & understanding, if needed)
- Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster
- Signed a petition
- Taken part in a public demonstration
- Boycotted certain products
- Deliberately bought certain products for political reasons

- Donated money to a political organisation or group
- Taken part in a strike
- Contacted the media
- Contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons

Independent variables

As suggested by studies of political participation at the individual level both socio-demographic and socioeconomic characteristics do affect the political behavior of individuals (Verba and Nie 1972, Verba et al. 1995, Brady et al. 2001). We introduced as control variables socio-demographic characteristics as gender (1= male and 0=female) and age (three categories: 1 =15-24, 2=25-44 3=45+) and socioeconomic variables namely the level of education (three categories: 1 = at least Post-secondary, non-tertiary education; 2 = Upper secondary education; 3 = up to lower level of secondary education or 2nd stage of basic education), language proficiency (dichotomous for which a score of 1 was assigned when interviewees spoke the host country language fluently) and occupational class considering three modalities: 1=top class, 2=middle class, 3=working class and (only for Milan)⁹. For the Milanese case we further controlled for the citizenship hold by interviewees.

The independent variable we focused on is the religious membership of individuals but we also looked at the most diffused forms of membership. These variables are all dichotomous and a score of 1 was assigned when interviewees were part of the organization.

⁹ The occupational class has been calculated through a procedure using three indicators, specifically the 1988 ISCO code for the classification of professions, the supervision of people and the professional positions (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1995, Bison et al.). This procedure led to the EGP classification of individuals in 11 occupational classes. We then reduced the classification to 3 modalities (working class, middle class and top class) .

The study

The political opportunity structures in Milan and Zurich

Table 3 shows that, although both Milan and Zurich are close to the ethnic conception of citizenship, Milan scores higher than Zurich in terms of individual rights granted to foreigners, especially with regard to rights concerning the long permits to stay and the access to nationality.

Table 3. CITIZENSHIP REGIME: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS DIMENSION (-1= ethnic; +1=civic territorial)

	MILAN			ZURICH		
ACCESS TO THE COMMUNITY	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	Turks	Kosovars	Italians
Short term permits	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1
Long term permits	0	0	0	-4	-4	-3
Access to nationality	0	0	0	-2	-2	-2
Family reunion	-1	-1	-1	0	0	2
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS						
Labour market access	-1	-1	-1	1	1	3
WELFARE STATE	0	0	0	-1	-1	1
ANTI DISCRIMINATION RIGHTS	0	0	0	1	1	1
POLITICAL RIGHTS	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2
TOTAL	-5	-5	-5	-10	-10	-10

Source: elaboration from LOCALMULTIDEM data on citizenship regime

On the contrary, on the cultural right dimension of the citizenship regime, the rights which are granted in the 2 cities at the cultural level, Zurich scores higher than Milan (table 4)¹⁰. As table 4 shows, the differential group right dimension is more segmented in Milan than in Zurich. All together the values assigned to the opportunity structure as to cultural rights in Milan score lower than those assigned to Zurich. The main difference between Milan and Zurich lies on the religion rights for which Milan scores -2 and Zurich plus 2. The scores mainly change because of different group rights granted to members of different religions. Whereas Catholic people in Italy have a privileged position with respect to other religions, there is no such distinction in Zurich which adopts a more neutral approach with respect to any kind of religion. Specific indicators show for example that, whereas in Zurich no religious education is taught in public schools, in Milan and, more generally in Italy, as foreseen by an agreement signed in 1984, only Catholic religion can be

¹⁰ Indicators of the cultural right dimension concern several dimensions, namely requirements which are demanded to foreigners to obtain access to the national community (for obtaining short-term permits, long term permits and naturalization) rights that are granted concerning the language programs of migrants (host-country language programs for immigrant adults and Host-country language programs for immigrant children), schooling (possibility of public funding for Muslim private owned schools (full-time schools) and other minorities, cultural/language courses for pupils of minority groups inside public schools, change in public schools' curriculum to take into account the cultural diversity of society) religion (religious education in public schools, Islamic religious signs in the public sector, Islamic religious signs in the private sector, Islamic breaks for praying, cemeteries and burial according to Islamic rite, Local public budget for mosques (building and managing) and media (Islamic religious programs in public and state-subsidized private broadcasting (not including cable and satellite, programs in public and state-subsidized private broadcasting (not including cable and satellite) for other minority groups or for the whole immigrant population as well as the labour market group rights (affirmative actions for ethnic minorities in the private sector, affirmative actions for ethnic minorities in the private and public sector).

taught in public schools. Whereas there is no distinction between Zurich and Milan on the scores regarding religion signs in the public and private sectors, nor on scores assigned on Islamic breaks for praying¹¹, scores change for indicators concerning the cemeteries and burial according to Islamic rite. In Milan, the possibility of using special spaces in the cemetery to be used for Islamic rituals is regulated by a 1990 law¹². Special and separated sections in cemetery plans can be arranged for the burial of people professing a cult which is different from Catholicism. City Mayors can also grant to foreign communities a special area of the cemetery aimed at the burial of their co-nationals. Some aspects of the Islamic rites of burial are thus accepted, like the orientation of the graves towards the Mecca, however other are not like the burial into the earth without coffins¹³. On its side, in Zurich, although until 2001 the cantonal decree on cemeteries didn't allow the creation of separate spaces in cemeteries, in 2001, the decree on cemeteries was modified to allow separate spaces for other religions in public cemeteries. This allowed the creation of a space for Muslims in 2004 in the City of Zurich, where burials according to Islamic rite are allowed¹⁴.

Tab. 4 DIFFERENTIAL GROUP RIGHTS DIMENSION (-1=cultural monism; +1=cultural pluralism)

	MILAN			ZURICH		
	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	Turks	Kosovars	Italians
Cultural requirements to access community	3	3	3	1	1	1
Language programs	0	0	0	2	2	2
Schooling	-2	-2	-2	-3	-3	-3
Religion	-2	-2	-2	2	2	2
Media	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2
Labour market group rights	-2	-2	-2	-1	-1	-1
TOTAL	-4	-4	-4	-1	-1	-1

Source: elaboration from LOCALMULTIDEM data on citizenship regime

Considering the citizenship regime as consisting of the individual and cultural right dimension figure 1 shows that both cities are in the bottom left square which means that both are closer to an ethnic and cultural monist conception of citizenship regime even though Milan shows more open conditions as to individual rights and closer in cultural rights with respect to Zurich.


¹¹ The Italian law grants to all workers the possibility to have sufficient time for obligations requested by their cults; they also exclude the possibility of firing workers due to their religious faiths and grant workers the possibility of manifesting their faith on the place of work (L. 339/1958, L. 604/1966 and L. 300/1970). These laws were not specifically meant to deal with Islamic breaks for praying though. No information was found on the implementation of this right in Milan. In Zurich, no public regulation regarding Islamic breaks for praying. It is left to the negotiation between employers and employees.

¹² Italian D.Lgs. 333/1998.

¹³ Islamic rites of burial are not allowed in Italy except for the only existing Islamic cemetery in Trieste which exists since 1849 when Trieste was ruled by the Austro-Hungarian empire.

¹⁴ As to the public budget for religious building and managing, in Italy it is granted to Catholic building whereas no information was found on budget for funding mosques in Milan. In Zurich religious associations can be subsidized only for a project on intercultural exchange. Thus no possibility of financing infrastructures.

FIGURE 1: Configuration of citizenship regimes in Milan and Zurich



A-B: INDIVIDUAL, EQUAL RIGHTS DIMENSION (A= ethnic; B=civic territorial)
A-C: DIFFERENTIAL GROUP RIGHTS DIMENSION (A=cultural pluralism; C= cultural monism)
Source: elaboration from LOCALMULTIDEM data on citizenship regime (Koopmans and Statham 2000, Koopmans et al. 2005).

The organizational context in Milan and Zurich

We take a look at the organizational context to see which kinds of organizational memberships prevail in the 2 cities. We are particularly concerned with the religious organizational membership to see if the religious recognition prevailing in the institutional context of Milan is reproduced in the organizational structure through its polarization around religion and to see how Milan's organizational structure differs from Zurich's.

Table 5 shows that membership in religious organizations in Milan is by far higher than any other kind of membership. The presence of religious based organizations is especially high for Filipinos in Milan. Contrarily to the picture provided for Milan, Zurich shows a much more heterogeneous organizational context. In fact whereas in Milan only 3 kinds of organizations capture most memberships (religious organizations, trade unions and sport clubs have more that 4% of members¹⁵), in Zurich memberships are much more widespread across different kinds of organizations and thus less polarized. Migrants in Zurich are members of different kinds of organizations and more than 4% of migrants are members of sport clubs, cultural organizations, trade unions, humanitarian and ethnic organizations.

Tab. 5 Distribution of memberships (present or past and present) in Milan and Zurich

KIND OF ORGANIZATION	Filipinos (MI)	Egyptians (MI)	Ecuadorians (MI)	Three migrants groups in Milan		Italians (ZU)	Kosovars (ZU)	Turks (ZU)	Three migrants groups in Zurich	
				v.a	%				v.a	%
A. Sports club	8	8	23	40	4,4	28	16	34	78	8.6
B. Cultural org	5	7	11	23	2,6	22	9	17	48	5.3
C. Political Party	2	1	0	3	0,3	5	6	2	13	1.4
D. Trade union	20	14	14	48	5,3	28	12	12	52	5.8
E. Business org	1	2	2	6	0,7	12	4	4	20	2.2
F. humanitarian org	1	2	2	6	0,7	21	18	11	50	5.5
G. environmental org	3	0	0	3	0,3	12	2	5	19	2.1
H. Human rights org	2	1	0	4	0,4	3	1	3	7	0.8
I. Religious org	46	4	14	63	7,0	20	4	9	33	3.7
J. Immigrants org	6	1	3	10	1,1	13	2	3	18	2
K. Ethnic org	7	2	2	11	1,2	16	7	17	40	4.4
L. Anti-racism org	0	1	2	3	0,3	0	1	0	1	0,1
M. Educational org	4	0	6	11	1,2	6	6	6	18	2,0
N. Youth org	2	2	1	5	0,6	2	3	1	6	0,7
O. org for the retired	0	0	0	0	0	8	2	2	12	1,3
P. Women's org	1	1	1	3	0,3	2	0	3	5	0,6
Q. neighbourhood org	2	1	1	4	0,4	7	3	4	14	1.6
Other orgs	3	0	0	3	0,3	6	3	4	13	1,4
TOTAL	80 (10%)	35 (4,4%)	63 (7,8%)	179	22,3	115 (14,3%)	59 (7,3%)	85 (10,6%)	259	32,2

Source: LOCALMULTIDEM data of population survey. (N migrants in Milan: 900; N migrants in Zurich: 902).

Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for religious memberships in the 2 cities and for each migrant group. It shows similarities and differences between and within the 2 cities with respect to the religious membership. Results on Milan show that the 3 observed migrant groups have together much higher values in religious membership than migrants in Zurich. There are also strong differences among migrant groups within each city which, as table 7 shows, do prove to be significant. Within each city memberships of Catholic groups (Filipinos and Ecuadorians in Milan and Italians in Zurich) score much higher than groups of Muslim religion¹⁶. Analyses of variance in

¹⁵ Trade union membership also scores high. This result is consistent with the previous literature on the Italian case highlighting the importance of trade unions in being bridging actors between immigrants and Italian institutions given that they provide legal assistance and other services to immigrants (Caponio 2005).

¹⁶ The data in Milan do not show the importance of religious based organizations for Egyptians. However, the presence of Egyptian organizational membership based on religious traits is underestimated given that the field work has

table 7 show that religious memberships are both significant between the 2 cities and within each city.

Tab. 6 Membership in religious organizations

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Membership in at least one organization:			
All immigrants in Milan	900	0,199	0,399
All immigrants in Zurich	902	0,287	0,453
Membership in religious organization:			
All immigrants in Milan	900	,070	,256
All immigrants in Zurich	902	,037	,188
Specific migrant groups in Milan			
Filipinos	300	,152	,360
Egyptians	300	,013	,114
Ecuadorians	300	,045	,208
Specific migrant groups in Zurich			
Italians	300	,067	,250
Kosovars	302	,013	,114
Turks	300	,030	,188

Source: LOCALMULTIDEM data of population survey. (N migrants in Milan: 900; N migrants in Zurich: 902).

Tabella 7 ANOVA table on difference in religious membership of migrants in Milan and Zurich

		SQ	gl	QM	F
Differences between migrants in Zurich and Milan	Fra i gruppi	,510	1	,510	10,130***
	Nei gruppi	90,552	1800	,050	
	Totale	91,062	1801		
Differences among migrant groups in Milan	Fra i gruppi	3,178	2	1,589	25,643***
	Nei gruppi	55,582	897	,062	
	Totale	58,760	899		
Differences among migrant groups in Zurich	Fra i gruppi	,449	2	,224	6,439***
	Nei gruppi	31,344	899	,035	
	Totale	31,793	901		

Source: LOCALMULTIDEM data of population survey. (N migrants in Milan: 900; N migrants in Zurich: 902).

***significant at level $\alpha=0,001$, **significant at level $\alpha=0,05$

These first results show that in Milan, the religious recognition by institutions strongly shapes the meso structure of opportunities and constraints which is also affected by religion. The recognition at the institutional level is reproduced at the organizational level. By this, in Milan the macro and meso structures of opportunities and constraints can be said to overlap given that they are both shaped by religion. Differently, in Zurich, given that the religion dimension is not recognized at the institutional level, opportunities and constraints rather intersect at different levels and along different attributes thus blurring the saliency of the religious issue.

We now turn our interest on the different effect that overlapping or intersecting macro and meso structures may have on political participation of migrants. As hypothesized, we expect that the religious issue in Milan which is a salient issue at the institutional and organizational levels more strongly affects political action of migrants. Differently, religion would not shape the political participation of migrants in Zurich given that religion is not institutionally recognized and does not shape the opportunities and constraints at the organizational level.

revealed some difficulties by members of this group in answering on membership in associations linked to mosques in Milan.

The political participation of migrants in Milan and Zurich

So far we have looked at contextual factors at the macro and meso levels of the 2 cities by presenting the indicators on the citizenship regime in the cities and the organizational structure in terms of individual membership.

In this section we study migrants' mobilization and particularly how religious organizational membership affects the political participation of migrants. We consider several forms of political mobilization of migrants namely contacts with public and political actors and several kinds of unconventional political action (table 8). Table 8 shows migrant participation in at least one political activity. In Zurich levels of participation are much higher than in Milan given that more than 20 % of migrants have taken part in at least one political activity whereas in Milan only 10,1 % of migrants have done so. The most performed activities in the 2 cities are, in Zurich, the signature of a petition followed by the boycott of certain products and, in Milan, the participation in public demonstration and the signature of petitions.

Table 8 Immigrants who have participated in at least one of the following political activities

Kind of activity	Zurich		Milan	
	a.v.	%	a.v.	%
A. Contacted a politician	32	3,5	15	1,6
B. Contacted a government or local government official	16	1,8	18	2,0
C. Worked in a political party	10	1,1	7	0,7
D. Worked in a political action group (NOTE: provide country-specific examples for correct translation & understanding, if needed)	15	1,7	6	0,7
E. Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster	8	0,9	20	2,2
F. Signed a petition	50	5,5	26	2,9
G. Taken part in a public demonstration	42	4,7	32	3,5
H. Boycotted certain products	44	4,9	16	1,8
I. Deliberately bought certain products for political reasons	23	2,5	8	0,9
J. Donated money to a political organisation or group	40	4,4	10	1,1
K. Taken part in a strike	11	1,2	17	1,9
L. Contacted the media	30	3,3	14	1,6
M. Contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons	20	2,2	20	2,2
All activities	191	21,2	91	10,1

Source: LOCALMULTIDEM data of population survey. (N migrants in Milan: 900; N migrants in Zurich: 902).

We test our second hypothesis by means of binary logistic regressions (nested models). Although we focus on the impact of religious membership on political participation, each of the following tables (tables 9 and 10) shows four separate models: in model 1 we first include the indicators of socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender), in model 2 we introduce socio-economic characteristics (education, language proficiency and social class in Milan) in model 3 we add the indicator of religious membership. Finally in model 4 we present the full model which includes the indicators on the 5 types of associations of which migrants are mostly members of. This allows us to respond our main question on the different role of religious membership in the 2 cities as well as to determine which of the explanatory factors included in our model (sociodemographic characteristics, socio-economic characteristics, associational membership) have more explanatory power (by looking at changes in the explained variance).

If we now look at tables 9 and 10 showing results on the probability of migrants to perform at least one political activity, among the socio-demographic characteristics gender is in Zurich always strongly significant whereas age seems not to be relevant. In Milan, gender does not prove to be significant in all models even though in model 1 and 3 males have higher probabilities to get involved than women. The youngest age class members (15-25) have also significantly higher probabilities to participate than the oldest population.

As previous studies show (see SES model), the socio-economic status strongly and significantly accounts for the political participation of migrants. In Milan being part of the middle or top occupational classes rises the probability of being involved in one political activity with respect to people from the working class and people having a middle or high educational degree also have more probability to be involved than people having a low educational degree. Also people who can talk Italian fluently have higher probabilities to get engaged in politics. For Zurich the socioeconomic status is also highly significant with regard to the level of education but, as opposed to Milan, language does not play a significant role in explaining political participation of immigrants.

Considering the focus of our analysis, religious membership does count in Milan whereas it has no effect on the political participation of migrants in Zurich (model 3). Results of the binary logistic regressions on political participation of migrants in Milan and Zurich thus confirm our second hypothesis by which the political participation of migrants in Milan is more strongly affected by religious organizational membership. The saliency of the religious cleavage in Milan seems thus to provide immigrant members of religious associations with resources that this type of organization do not provide in Zurich. The significance of religious membership in Milan also holds when we introduce the most important forms of organizational involvement (model 4). Trade union membership, ethnic and cultural memberships do not prove to be significant for the Milanese case and membership in sport clubs instead does also prove to provide better opportunities to get involved in political actions. In Zurich whereas religious membership does not have any impact on the political participation of migrants, all the most important associational memberships excluding trade unions, do prove to have an impact and provide more resources for political participation of migrants.

Political participation in Milan seems shaped by fewer kinds of organizational membership, only sport and religious memberships, consistently with a more homogeneous organizational context, whereas in Zurich where there is a more heterogeneous organizational context, different kinds of membership do provide useful resources for political participation.

Table 9 : Participation of immigrants in Milan. Unstandardized coefficients and standard error of binary logistic regressions (nested models)¹⁷.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	B	S.E	B	S.E	B	S.E	B	S.E
Gender	.321*	.231	.275	.265	.442*	.276	.344	.281
Age 15-24	.593*	.354	.671	.431	.821*	.443	.845*	.451
Age 25-44	-.074	.313	.092	.337	.242	.350	.222	.357
Age 45+ (ref)								
Low level of education (ref)								
Middle level of education			.700*	.424	.685*	.427	.736*	.432
High level of education			1.215***	.441	1.128***	.445	1.060**	.455
Working class (ref)								
Middle class			.838***	.274	.918***	.280	.854***	.285
High class			1.824***	.545	2.084***	.561	2.037***	.580
Speaks fluently			1.443***	.278	1.467***	.283	1.445***	.289
Member of religious org.					1.269 ***	.396	1.083***	.417
Member of sport org.							.899**	.460
Member of cultural org.							.520	.683
Member of trade union							.423	.490
Member of ethnic org							1.124	.777
Constant	-2.432***	.290	-3.871***	.504	-4.233***	.537	-4.252***	.542
Nagelkerke R Square	.017**		.210***		.231***		.250***	

Source: LOCALMULTIDEM data of population survey. (N migrants in Milan: 900).

Significance : *:0,1 ; **:0,5 ;***:0,01

Table 10 : Participation of immigrants in Zurich. Unstandardized coefficients and standard error of binary logistic regressions (nested models)¹⁸.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	B	S.E	B	S.E	B	S.E	B	S.E
Gender	.489***	.186	.439**	.192	.424**	.192	.408**	.198
15-24	-.218	.329	-.423	.344	-.391	.345	-.440	.359
25-44	.057	.171	-.127	.182	-.114	.183	-.168	.191
45+ (ref)								
Low level of education (ref)								
Middle level of education			.416*	.225	.439*	.226	.333	.235
High level of education			.893***	.208	.900***	.209	.872***	.215
Working class (ref)								
Middle class								
High class								
Speaks fluently			.239	.185	.242	.186	.124	.195
Member of religious org.					.628	.393	-	-
Member of sport org.							.666***	.283
Member of cultural org.							.964***	.355
Member of trade union							.094	.344
Member of ethnic org							.932***	.369
Member of humanitarian org							1.114***	.328
Constant	-1.662	.187	-2.023***	.213	-2.058***	.215	-2.180***	.223
Nagelkerke R Square	.015**		.062***		.066***		.139***	

Source: LOCALMULTIDEM data of population survey. (N migrants in Zurich: 902).

Significance : *:0,1 ; **:0,5 ;***:0,01

¹⁷ Although results are not shown, model 4 holds when controlling for the ethnic group.¹⁸ For model 4 in Zurich we excluded religious organizational membership given that it is not significant and just inserted the 5 most important kinds of associational involvement.

Conclusions

We have tried to show how the structural dimensions at the macro and meso levels differently intertwine and affect political participation of migrants.

The first hypothesis is confirmed given that the Milanese institutional system is highly segmented along the religious cleavage with respect to Zurich and the religious cleavage in Milan strongly shapes opportunities and constraints at the institutional and organizational level whereas it does not so in Zurich.

As expected for the second hypothesis, religion becomes a salient issue in politics in more polarized contexts like Milan. By this, religious membership in Milan tends to be more strongly associated with the political participation of migrants. The recognition of the religious cleavage at the institutional level seems thus providing more legitimacy as political actors to members of religious based organizations. On the other hand, in a more heterogeneous religious context like Zurich where there is no institutional recognition of religion, religious organizations do not seem to provide resources for the political participation of their members. More differentiated kinds of organizational memberships do prove instead to be related to higher probabilities of political participation of migrants.

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